This paper primarily demonstrates the existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibria in a general class of topological vector spaces of commodity bundles. Two conditions based on production possibilities, preferences, and the topological nature of bounded sets are shown to substitute, in any locally convex space, for the advantages of the Euclidean topology. Examples fulfilling these conditions are supplied. The approach is that of Bewley, demonstrating equilibria on finite-dimensional sub-economies and establishing a net of these equilibria that converges to an equilibrium on the whole commodity space. An example of equilibrium with a storage technology is given. An auxiliary result concerns the price support of efficient allocations.
Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of existence of Walrasian equilibria, stated and solved first for the finite-dimensional case by Arrow and Debreu [1] , and generalized to roughly its ultimate state in the setting of finitely many agents with complete preference relations by Debreu [6; Chapter 10] in 1962. In departing from a Euclidean setting for this problem, one neither gains at all in tractability nor suffers inordinately from any failure of geometric insights. In approaching this problem then, the objective will be to take Debreu's 1962 assumptions as given, and limit any additional assumptions to a minimum. As one might expect, the set of conditions stated by Debreu, extended to any locally convex choice space, falls short on two key topological points: the compactness of feasible allocations in the choice space and the compactness of the price "simplex" in the dual space. These points are shown to be surmountable by adding two corresponding topological assumptions that can be immediately fulfilled in many useful infinite-dimensional choice spaces, including any of those previously studied in the context of this problem, such as R n , L p spaces, ℓ p spaces, and any of the other conjugate Banach spaces. Other spaces encompassed in this paper include any of the semi-reflexive spaces or Montel spaces, for instance C ∞ spaces of "smooth" functions (which are not normed spaces). This is not to say, however, that all previous results are subsumed here. By insightfully posing smoothness conditions on agents' preferences, Andreu Mas-Colell [11] overcame these topological barriers by a different approach, as explained shortly. His work on an exchange economy in conjugate Banach lattices instigated this paper. Zame [18] has extended Mas-Colell's approach to production economies, but there is still a gap between the two basic approaches that remains as a challenge to be filled.
Why study infinite-dimensional spaces ? There are many applications whose natural setting involves "blends" of commodity characteristics, or uncertain states of the world governed by non-atomic probability measures, or dynamic models whose objects of choice are functions of time. Much new work in equilibrium theory addresses economies whose choice vectors are stochastic processes. In this and many other settings, agents' optimal plans can often be succinctly characterized via some form of control theory in infinite-dimensional function spaces. In short, a theory for general choice spaces is called for.
In equilibrium analysis one invariably wishes to select candidate price vectors from some compact convex set not including zero. The unit simplex for R n is just such a set for Euclidean analysis but its analogue in general dual spaces, for example positive price vectors of unit norm for normed spaces, need not be satisfactory. If the positive cone of the choice space has interior, however, the set of positive price vectors with value one, say, at a particular choice vector in the interior of this cone forms an appropriate "neo-simplex". This idea goes back as far as Debreu's papers of three decades ago [6; Chapters 5 and 7] . Of course one needn't limit oneself to the "original" positive cone of the choice space, particularly if it has no interior. MasColell, for example, constructs a cone with interior from the properties of agent's preferences; no vector in this cone can be split up among agents and subtracted from any efficient allocation so as to make each agent better off. Thus any efficient allocation can be supported in a "valuation equilibrium" [6; Ch.5] by a price vector with positive values on this cone by virtue of the separating hyperplane theorem. Such a cone is characterized as a "price block" in Section 3. Mas-Colell's result requires fairly weak restrictions on the choice space, but rather strong conditions on consumption sets -they must be the positive cone of the choice space.
The alternative taken here is to assemble the largest cone, say Γ, whose elements must have positive market value in any valuation equilibrium, and then to assume that Γ has interior, fitting into its role as a price block, the pre-requisite for a neo-simplex. Debreu [6; Ch.10 ] constructed just such a cone to alleviate the free disposal assumption. Suppose, for example, that the production set contains a cone A. Then any valuation equilibrium places negative market values on A, for otherwise some firm has unbounded profits. Thus −A ⊂ Γ. Next, suppose D is a cone, each of whose elements can be re-scaled and then shared among agents so that, added to their endowments, the resulting allocation Pareto dominates any feasible allocation. Then any element of D must have a positive market value in any valuation equilibrium, and D ⊂ Γ. Further material can be added to Γ as discussed in Section 3, in particular by augmenting the production set. How a production set might come to contain a cone with interior is also discussed there, with examples in Section 6. More work is called for on this last point.
The mechanics of demonstrating an equilibrium given a neo-simplex also differ from those of Mas-Colell, who finds a fixed point in the (utility simplex × price neo-simplex) space. Since functional utility representations of preferences in general choice spaces with production is not guaranteed, the fixed point here is in the (allocation × price neo-simplex) space. The stated philosophy of extending Euclidean insights to general choice spaces is actually put to work, following Truman Bewley's blueprint [4] . If Debreu's conditions apply to an economy E with a general choice space L, then they also apply to each of the "sub-economies" E λ induced by a corresponding net {F λ } of finite-dimensional vector subspaces of L, directed so as to include any particular vector at some point in the net. Provided only that L is locally convex, each F λ is equivalent topologically with a Euclidean space, whence an equilibrium for E λ follows without any additional work. A cluster point of the resulting net of "sub-equilibria" exists and is an equilibrium for E. The difficult competitive analysis, then, takes place in Euclidean space, where it is easy. Debreu's rather complicated proof is "boot-strapped" up to a general class of vector spaces.
The next section merely sets up the basic notation and definitions. The following one develops the notion of "price blocks". Section 4 has the main result, showing conditions ensuring the existence of quasi-equilibria with production in a general class of infinite-dimensional choice spaces. Section 5 shows the existence of price support for efficient allocations under less stringent conditions than those adopted for demonstrating equilibria. A simple example showing the new theory in action appears in Section 6. The final section contains a few general remarks. The Appendix extends several results on recession cones that Debreu [5] stated for Euclidean spaces.
The Basic Equilibrium Problem
In this section we briefly cover the notation and definitions for the competitive equilibrium problem, largely following Debreu [5] . Let L be a vector (choice) space over the field of real numbers, with algebraic dual L ′ , the space of linear functionals on L. We consider the following finite agent economy on L:
where X i ⊂ L are consumption sets, ≽ i are preferences (complete transitive binary orders) on X i , Y j ⊂ L are production sets, ω i ∈ L are endowments, and θ ij ∈ [0, 1] are firm shares, for all i ∈ M = {1, . . . , m} and all j ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}. Of course
For convenience, a budget-constrained valuation equilibrium is termed a compensated equilibrium, after an effectively equivalent concept in Arrow and Hahn [2; p.108] 
′ whose elements are continuous. We will limit our search for an equilibrium price functional to L * because of its convenient topological properties.
Price Blocks
This section illustrates how certain properties of the Euclidean positive cone (or orthant) that facilitate competitive analysis in R n can be recovered under the right conditions in general vector choice spaces with the following substitute for a positive cone. Throughout the remainder, some linear topology on L is assumed. A convex cone 2 Γ ⊂ L is a price block for E provided it has interior and any price supported weakly efficient allocation can be supported by an element of Γ
• , the polar 3 of Γ. If Γ is a price block for E, we can limit our search for an equilibrium price vector to Γ
• . This explains the term "price block": the hyperplanes supporting Γ are blocked from intersecting an entire neighborhood contained by Γ, and thus from being "too steep" in any direction. In fact, since price vectors are subject to division by a strictly positive scalar without economic effect, we can restrict our search even further to Γ ∑ n ℓ=1 p ℓ = 1}. Later we will exploit the fact that the compactness of Γ • y extends, in an appropriate topology, to any locally convex space 4 . Then any net in Γ
• y has a non-zero cluster point, which, with the 1 A topological vector space is a vector space that is also a topological space whose points are closed sets, and for which vector addition and scalar multiplication are continuous functions. A topology τ on a vector space L is linear if (L, τ ) is a topological vector space. It will always be implicit here that these are vector spaces over the scalar field of real numbers. This definition, due to Walter Rudin [8] , ensures for convenience that any topological vector space is a Hausdorff space. A topological space is Hausdorff, or separated, or T 2 , if every pair of distinct points have corresponding disjoint neighborhoods.
2 A subset C of a vector space is a cone provided αC = C for any scalar α > 0. right construction of the net, will turn out to be an equilibrium price vector. This same idea is used in Florenzano [7] and , where L is a Banach space and E is an exchange economy. Florenzano assumes that L is also ordered 5 , and that its disposal cone has interior, thereby serving as a price block. Mas-Colell gives smoothness conditions on agents' preferences, called "properness", ensuring the existence of a price block, provided L is a Banach lattice 6 and additionally that each agent's consumption set is the positive cone. Mas-Colell's results are easily extended to locally convex vector lattices, by the following extension of properness. A preference relation ≽ on a subset X of a topological vector space L is v-proper, for some non-zero vector v ∈ L, if there is a zero neighborhood N with the property: for any x ∈ X, z ∈ L, and scalar α > 0 such that x − αv + z ∈ X, the relationship x − αv + z ≽ x implies that z is not an element of αN . The intuition is that one cannot compensate a v-proper agent for a loss of v by any vector that is "too small". For an exchange economy, this ensures that the set of vectors that can be shared among agents and added to any efficient allocation so as to yield a Pareto improvement is disjoint from a cone that includes as an interior point the sum across agents of the "properness" vectors v [11; Prop. VII]. The resulting quasiequilibrium existence theorem is stated in Section 4.3.
One can also obtain a price block, perhaps, on the production side of the economy. Suppose some fixed "large" input vector y I ∈ L can be converted in production to any output vector y O ∈ N , where N is some sufficiently small neighborhood of zero. That is, suppose y O − y I ∈ Y for all y O ∈ N , and furthermore that this production technology has constant returns to scale, implying that
Section 6 contains an example of such a technology. Clearly Γ is a convex cone, and thus a price block. For if p ∈ L ′ supports any allocation, then p · y ≤ 0 for all y ∈ Γ, for otherwise profits would be unbounded, and thus p ∈ Γ
• . Of course the existence of a price block contained by Y need not arise from such a restrictive technology. The weakest condition on Y ensuring that it contains a price block is that its recession cone 5 A vector space L is partially ordered by a convex cone C by writing x ≥ y whenever x − y ∈ C. In this case C is called the positive cone of L and denoted L + .
6 An ordered vector space is a lattice (or Riesz space) provided the infimum of any two vectors under the ordering exists. See Schaefer [15] . For example, spaces of differentiable functions are not generally lattices. A locally convex vector lattice is a lattice that is a locally convex space in which the lattice decomposition x → x + is continuous. A Banach lattice is a locally convex vector lattice whose topology is given by a complete norm. Illustrative examples are the L q (µ) spaces, 1 ≤ q ≤ ∞. 7 The recession cone of a convex set B ⊂ L, denoted A(B), is the set {z ∈ L : {z} + B ⊂ B}. This is elaborated in the appendix.
by Debreu [6; Ch.5] .
Of course, it may be that A(Y ) has no interior, but even so, all is not lost! Following McKenzie [12, 13] and Debreu [6; Ch.10] , define an augmented production set to be any subsetŸ of L containing Y and generating the same feasible allocations:
For purposes of demonstrating an equilibrium, one can assume temporarily that the production set isŸ . Any resulting equilibrium must also be an equilibrium for the economy whose production possibilities are given by the smaller production set Y . The trick, of course, is that one may be able to place enough potential production choices inŸ to ensure that A(Ÿ ) has interior. General conditions under which such an augmentation can be successful have not been studied.
There is yet a further weakening of the conditions ensuring the existence of a price block, again following related work by McKenzie and Debreu. First, letX i denote the projection of the set of feasible allocations (x, y) ∈ L m+n into the i-th co-ordinate subspace. That is,X i is the set of feasible allocations for agent i. Next, let D be the smallest cone (that is, the intersection of all cones) in L containing the preference generated set
The set D is effectively the set of vectors that can be shared somehow among agents to strictly Pareto dominate any feasible allocation. For example, if L is an ordered vector space and preferences are strictly monotonic 8 then L + ⊂ D. Roughly speaking, the production set Y can also be augmented by −D without changing the set of potential equilibria, a claim formalized by Debreu [6; Ch.10] . Thus the convex cone A(Ÿ ) − D is also a price block provided it has interior, a much weaker
If L is a locally convex vector lattice and X i = L + for all i, still further weakening may be possible following the tack taken by Mas-Colell. A successful combination of the two approaches has yet to be demonstrated, however.
Existence of Quasi-equilibria
In this section we prove existence of quasi-equilibria with production in any locally convex choice space, under stated conditions. The approach is that of Bewley [4] , establishing quasi-equilibria on a net of finite-dimensional subspaces of the choice space. These quasi-equilibria converge to a quasi-equilibrium on the whole space. The basic assumptions are those of Debreu [6; Ch.10] , which is among the most general treatments of equilibrium existence for finite-dimensional competitive economies, plus two assumptions that meet our needs in the infinite-dimensional case.
Preliminaries
The assumptions from Debreu's 1962 article [6; Ch.10] are listed below with minor alterations. The conditions stated as (a.1) and (d.2) are equivalent in locally compact spaces such as Euclidean spaces to the conditions Debreu actually stated:
, and imply them in general, as proved in the Appendix. The non-satiation assumption (b.1) of Debreu is strengthened to local non-satiation here. We take some linear topology τ for the choice space L, hopefully natural to the economic setting. For conciseness the following nine assumptions are collectively referred to as the Debreu conditions:
for every i ∈ M : (a.2) X i is closed and convex;
there is a closed convex augmented total production setŸ such that
is bounded. We will need to add an additional topological assumption akin to the "Closedness Hypothesis" assumed by . The intent is to ensure that the set of feasible allocations, which is bounded under the Debreu conditions, can be captured in some compact set. This substitutes for the Heine-Borel property 10 of R n .
Capturing Hypothesis: There exists some linear topology T on L such that τ -bounded subsets of L are relatively T -compact and the following sets are
9 A set in a locally convex space is bounded if absorbed by every zero neighborhood. A set A absorbs a set B in a real vector space if there is some scalar α > 0 such that B ⊂ βA for all β ≥ α.
10 A topological vector space has the Heine-Borel property if each of its closed bounded subsets is compact. We need a preliminary lemma to show that the Debreu conditions, which ensure that the feasible consumption and total production sets are compact in a Euclidean space, do roughly the same job here.
Then any feasible allocation (x, y) ∈ L m+n , where y T = ∑ n j=1 y j , satisfies (x, y T ) ∈ G. Whenever the Capturing Hypothesis is in effect, we will use T k to denote the implied T -product topology on L k , for any positive integer k.
A number of alternative characterizations are given by Schaefer [15; p.144] . A reflexive space is a barrelled (e.g. normed) semi-reflexive space.
12 For any duality ⟨L, L * ⟩ the weak topology on L, denoted σ-⟨L, L * ⟩, is defined as the weakest topology preserving the duality.
13 A vector space is a conjugate space if it is dual to some other vector space.
14 If L = V * , for some other space V , the weak-star topology on L is the σ-⟨L, V ⟩ topology.
15 For a duality ⟨E, E * ⟩, the Mackey topology is that of uniform convergence on the set of all absolutely convex σ-⟨E * , E⟩ compact subsets of E * . This is the finest topology on E that is consistent with the duality ⟨E, E * ⟩. 16 A Montel space is a topological vector space with the Heine-Borel property, that is, in which any closed bounded subset is compact. 
from the continuity of addition in (L, T ). But v λ ∈ {−ω}, a closed compact set in any linear topology, for all λ ∈ Λ, so v ∈ {−ω}, implying z ∈ G.
The product of closed sets is closed in the product topology. Since G is T m+1 -closed and the intersection of closed sets is closed, it suffices to show that the projections of this product setX 1 , . . . ,X m andŶ are each bounded. For then each would be T -closed and therefore T -compact under the Capturing Hypothesis. By condition (d.2),Ŷ , the feasible total production set andX, the feasible total consumption set, are bounded. SupposeX k is not bounded for some k ∈ M . Then, sinceX is bounded,X k ∩ (− ∑ m i̸ =k X i ) must be unbounded, which contradicts (a.1).
The Main Theorem
Although the following theorem is stated for an extremely large class of topological vector spaces, the Capturing Hypothesis places a significant restriction on this class, or alternatively, on smoothness properties of agents' preferences and consumption sets. The proof is along the lines of Bewley [4; Theorem 1], starting with quasiequilibria on finite-dimensional subspaces of L and extending along a net. The statement includes Debreu's theorem [6;Ch.10] as a special case. LetD denote the smallest cone containing the preference generated set
Theorem 4.1. Suppose E is an economy on a locally convex choice space L that satisfies the Debreu Conditions and Capturing Hypothesis. If L is finite-dimensional or the augmented production setŸ can be chosen so that A(Ÿ ) −D has interior, then E has a quasi-equilibrium.
proof: By Lemma 4.1, for each agent i,X i is T -compact. Thus, given the Capturing Hypothesis,X i has a maximal element for ≽ i , which implies by condition (b.1) that there exists
Next, by condition (c.2), let
Let F be the set of finite dimensional subspaces of L containing the vectors: 
Of course, given Lemma 4.1, the limit is a feasible consumption and total production allocation, with x i in X i for each i ∈ M and y T in Y . Then there exists y j ∈ Y j for each j ∈ N such that y T = ∑ n j=1 y j , and (x, y) ∈ L m+n is a feasible allocation. We will show that (x, y, p) satisfies the remaining properties of a quasi-equilibrium. Here the proof follows the end of Bewley's proof closely.
First we claim that, for any feasible production allocation (ŷ) and any
Let F (λ) denote the subspace corresponding to the element λ of the net. By the definition of the net, the definition of equilibrium on the subspaces, and by the Capturing Hypothesis, there exists λ ′ ∈ Λ such that, for all λ ≥ λ ′ , the vectors x ′ ,ŷ 1 , . . . ,ŷ n are in F (λ) and
Since {p λ } converges weakly, we have (4.2). Now suppose x ′ ≽ i x i . By the local non-satiation assumption (b.1), for any neighborhood N of x ′ there exists
Since N is arbitrary, (4.2) applies to any x ′ ≽ i x i . In particular, we have
for each agent i. Since
The conclusion of the previous paragraph thus yields
For any firm j ∈ N and any z ∈ Y j , we can apply (4.2) to x ′ = x i for each i andŷ k = y k for k ̸ = j,ŷ j = z. This shows that p · z ≤ p · y j , implying that y j maximizes market value for each firm j. Combining this with (4.3) shows that (x, y, p) is a compensated equilibrium.
For a quasi-equilibrium it remains to show that one of (2.2) or (2.3) must hold. Suppose (2.3) does not hold and z ∈ X i is such that p · z < p · x i . Now suppose
But by continuity of preferences (b.2) there exists α ∈ [0, 1) such that x α ≻ i x i , a contradiction of (4.3). Thus (2.2) must hold.
For technical reasons, this theorem assumes that the cone A(Ÿ )−D has interior, rather than non-empty interior for the cone A(Ÿ ) − D that contains it. Nothing in the spirit of things, however, prevents one from adopting the weaker assumption that A(Ÿ ) − D has interior, at least under additional regularity conditions, such as those of the following proposition. These additional conditions are effectively null for exchange economies.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose E is an economy on a locally convex choice space satisfying the Debreu conditions and Capturing Hypothesis. If the augmented production setŸ can be chosen so that A(Ÿ ) − D has interior, then E has a quasiequilibrium under the additional conditions: X ∩ (Ÿ − D + {ω}) is bounded and Y is closed and convex.
proof: Let C be any closed convex cone with interior contained by A(Ÿ ) − D and let Θ = A(Ÿ )+C. LetẼ denote the economy identical to E except that Y j is replace byỸ j = Y j + Θ for all j ∈ N . Let the augmented production set forẼ be its own total production set Y + Θ. By the previous theorem,Ẽ has a quasi-equilibrium (x, y, p). The total production vector y T = ∑ j y j is of the form y * + y ′ − δ, where Debreu [5; there are two cases to check.
Case 1:
Case 2: Suppose, on the other hand,
Thus the hyperplane H generated by p separates X and {ω} + Y . Let (x,y) be any feasible allocation for E. Since
Remark 4.2:
Variations on these conditions will work. For example, any convex cone generated by a bounded subset of D can be substituted forD in the interior condition of Theorem 4.1. The proof that a quasi-equilibrium exists is straightforward.
Remark 4.3: The non-empty interior conditions of Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.1 can be weakened to non-empty Mackey-interior, since the Mackey topology is consistent with the given duality. No changes in the proofs are necessary. This weakening is not important in many applications since the original topology is often given by a metric, in which case it coincides with the Mackey topology [15] .
Remark 4.4: The (weak) convexity of preferences assumption (b.3) might be strengthened to convexity:
Then the other hypotheses of Theorem 4.1 also ensure the existence of compensated equilibria. In fact, the compensated and quasi-equilibrium concepts are equivalent under these strengthened assumptions. See the proofs of Debreu [5; 4.9 (1)- (2)] that also apply here. For future reference the yet stronger assumption of strong convexity of preferences is stated:
Under continuous preferences, the implications (b.
Remark 4.5: It will be noted that we did not actually use the property that the sets {x ∈ X i : z ≽ i x} are closed for each z in X i , for each agent i. In fact, we used only the property that such sets are lineally closed 17 . Thus the assumption of continuous preferences can be relaxed correspondingly.
There are many ways to argue that a quasi-equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium. Zame [18] has given several of these arguments, which are generally based on the nature of the choice space.
Proper Preferences and Quasi-equilibria
As promised, an easy extension of Mas-Colell's Theorem of quasi-equilibrium existence based on proper preferences is stated below for reference.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose E is an exchange economy on a locally convex vector lattice L, the Capturing Hypothesis applies, and for all i ∈ M :
Then E has both compensated equilibria and quasi-equilibria.
As remarked earlier, compensated equilibria and quasi-equilibria are the same under these assumptions. For simplicity, convex preferences (b.3 ′ ) are assumed here, rather than Mas-Colell's weaker assumption of weak convexity (b.3) plus strict monotonicity in the direction of v i and ω. Mas-Colell assumed that ω ̸ = 0, but of course if ω = 0 the trivially zero allocation and any non-zero p ∈ L ′ form an equilibrium in that case. proof: Theorem 4.2 is proved by Mas-Colell [11], with two minor changes. The Alaoglu-Bourbaki Theorem on the weak-star compactness of polars of a zeroneighborhood is substituted for Alaoglu's Theorem on the weak-star compactness of the unit ball of a conjugate Banach space. The continuity of the price functional p generating the separating hyperplane in Proposition VII is ensured by direct application of the separating hyperplane theorem [8] , which guarantees that the separating hyperplane is closed, or that p is continuous. The continuity of positive linear functionals on Banach lattices need not be invoked.
Remark 4.6:
There are many ways to argue that a quasi-equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium. Zame [18] has given several of these arguments, which depend critically on the nature of the choice space and the pattern of agents' endowments. For brevity, we will merely record that if (x, y, p) is a quasi-equilibrium, then it is also an equilibrium provided
For if (4.2) applies then the following four conditions constitute a contradiction under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1:
That is, by assumption (b.2), for some α ∈ (0, 1), we have αz
, contrary to the support properties of p.
Price Support of Efficient Allocations
This section addresses the existence of a price vector supporting an efficient allocation. The conditions are considerably weaker than those of the quasi-equilibrium existence theorem. The proposition is topology-free, applying an algebraic form of the separating hyperplane theorem, relying on a non-empty intrinsic core 18 condition rather than a non-empty interior condition. The non-empty core condition is weaker than non-empty interior and in any case is topology-free. The further weakening to non-empty intrinsic core will mainly be of value for economies on a proper subspace of the choice space.
m+n is an efficient allocation for an economy E then (x, y) can be supported by some p ∈ L ′ under the following conditions:
proof: First, 0 is not in the intrinsic core of Z since (x, y) is efficient, for otherwise, for some α ∈ (0, 1), we would have −αv k ∈ Z, implying the existence of a feasible allocation: 
To see that p supports (x, y), suppose x
18 The core of a subset W of a vector space L consists of all points w ∈ W such that, for each z ̸ = w there exists z ′ ∈ (w, z) such that the interval [w, z ′ ] is contained by W . The intrinsic core of W is the core of W relative to the affine hull of W .
Remark 5.1: Any weakly efficient allocation can be supported under the same hypothesis provided condition (iii) in the statement of the proposition is strengthened to apply to all i ∈ M . The proof is almost identical, so omitted.
Remark 5.2: This proposition remains true when condition (iv) in its statement is weakened to:
The proof is almost identical to the one given, using the fact that p · z ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ (Z − Γ) implies p ∈ Γ
• since Γ is a cone. For a continuous supporting price functional, of course, the usual non-empty interior condition of the Hahn-Banach theorem can be assumed, as in Debreu [6; Chapter 5] . As in Remark 4.3 we can weaken this by assuming only Mackey interior. Any positive linear functional on a Banach lattice is continuous [15] . For such spaces, for example L p spaces, even the algebraic form of the supporting price functional given by Proposition 5.1 is thus continuous with monotonic preferences or free disposal, either of which guarantee positivity.
Example: A Storage-Release Production Technology
Here we illustrate an economy for which an equilibrium can be demonstrated precisely thanks to the theory just developed. We pick the choice space
, under the product norm topology given by
The space R is interpreted as initial stocks of a commodity which can be stored and released for later consumption at a rate given by a square-integrable function of the unit time interval (an element of L 2 ([0, 1])). Specifically, the storage-release production technology is the production set
where r + denotes the positive part of the release rate r. That is, a feasible "netput" is one for which the total amount released is no more than the initial stock. This makes sense for economies with storable commodities; leisure time is a good counter-example. One could conceive, as an alternative justification, that there is an actual input-output technology admitting a similar production of non-storable commodities.
It is immediate that Y SR is itself a cone (closed under multiplication by positive scalars) and has interior. The latter property is evident for instance, from the fact that the ball of radius Although free disposal is implicit in the definition of Y SR , that can be avoided by the following device. Assume strictly monotonic preferences and, temporarily, add a free disposal firm Y 0 = −L + . Once an equilibrium is demonstrated, the chosen production from Y 0 is obviously zero, so the same equilibrium allocations and price vector are obviously an equilibrium for the economy without Y 0 . This is essentially the concept behind the use of the cone D in demonstrating quasi-equilibria. Now we have the following simple corollaries. For the next proposition let ω iR denote the projection of ω i from L into R, the amount of initial stored commodity endowed to agent i. We now have a simple and complete set of equilibrium conditions for this economy that are easily generalized.
Then E has an equilibrium under the following conditions, for all i ∈ M : The same approach can be used in a two period setting under uncertainty. One assumes that there exists some scalar α > 0 such that a fixed large quantity of deterministic first period input can be converted in some production technology to any output whose positive part has expected value smaller than α. The assumption is more onerous in this case, however. The same storage-release idea, perhaps combined with an actual production input-output technology can be quite plausibly applied to sequence choice spaces. The first element of an agent's endowed sequence vector would represent that agent's initial "capital stock".
Concluding Remarks
This paper has in part been an exploratory study of the alternative properties of infinite-dimensional spaces that make equilibrium analysis tractable. We will review. As explained, a positive cone with interior is very helpful. It makes our extra assumption that the production set contains a price block even weaker than free disposal. In this regard, and in the generalization of consumption sets and bounding restrictions, this paper generalizes the equilibrium existence theorems of Bewley [4] and Magill [10] along roughly the same lines that Debreu [6; Ch.10] generalizes Arrow and Debreu [1] .
This interior property aside, the "nicest" commodity spaces seem to be separable reflexive Banach lattices. Separability (along with the norm topology) "buys" the existence of utility representations for preferences. In conjunction with the Banach lattice property, separability also ensures that the positive cone has a quasiinterior, which makes the formulation of conditions ensuring equilibrium existence easier (See Zame [18] for details on the definition and importance of quasi-interior). This latter property is also shared by any of the spaces L q (µ) 1 ≤ q ≤ ∞, separable or not, (provided the underlying measure space is totally σ-finite.) Reflexivity makes superfluous the Capturing Hypothesis, a substitute for the local compactness of finite-dimensional spaces that crops up throughout this paper. In general, the ability to place some topology on the choice space in which feasible allocations are captured in a compact set seems imperative. The decomposition property of lattices [15] is important in the construction of a preference based price block [11] .
Mas-Colell [11] includes a fairly complete list of the literature on equilibria in infinite-dimensional choice spaces up to the time that this paper first appeared in 1983. Since then, however, several related papers have appeared. Mas-Colell's approach has been extended to general proper binary orders for preferences in a recent paper by Yannelis and Zame [17] . Jones [9] demonstrated equilibrium with production in a Banach space roughly along the lines of this paper. Zame [18] demonstrated equilibrium with production on a normed vector lattice by following the basic outline of Mas-Colell forming conditions on the "marginal efficiency" of production. Again, consumption sets are the positive cone. Although Zame's production conditions are somewhat complicated, they definitely seem less restrictive that assuming that the recession cone of the production set has interior, at least when the positive cone of the space itself has no interior. Certainly the current state of the art is not yet satisfactory in so far as posing simple and generally applicable conditions for the existence of equilibria in a range of vector spaces.
The original version of this paper includes several supplementary results that have been left out for brevity. These include sufficient conditions for the conclusions: a quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium, a valuation equilibrium has an efficient allocation, an exchange equilibrium has an efficient allocation, there exist efficient allocations, and an allocation in the core of the allocation game of all replications of an economy is an equilibrium.
Appendix -Recession Cones in General Spaces
This appendix is devoted to extending certain properties of recession cones stated by Debreu [5] for Euclidean spaces. Debreu's definition of recession cone applies to arbitrary sets in Euclidean spaces. The definition we give below applies to convex sets in arbitrary real vector spaces. Beer [3] examines the extension to non-convex sets, along with a different economic application. The recession cone, A(X), of a convex subset X of a real vector space L is the set {z ∈ L : {z}+X ⊂ X}. Recession cones are also known as "asymptotic cones" or "characteristic cones". If one follows the convention that a "cone" C must satisfy C ∩ −C = {0} (that is, C cannot be a nontrivial vector subspace), then recession cones are not actually cones, but rather "wedges", sets closed under multiplication by positive scalars. There does not seem to be a standard reference on recession cones for general vector spaces, although Holmes [8] has a few results. I have thus collected together the following properties, which are almost immediate from the definition above. 
The following lemma is from Holmes [8; p.34] and Beer [3] .
Lemma A.2. Suppose X is a convex subset of a real vector space L. Then
A(X) = {z ∈ L : x + αz ∈ X ∀α ∈ R + , ∀x ∈ X}.
If, in addition, L is a topological vector space in which X is closed, then, for any x ∈ X,
A(X) = {z ∈ L : x + αz ∈ X ∀α ∈ R + }. proof: If x ∈ X then z ∈ A(X) if and only if {x + αz : α ∈ R + } ⊂ X λ ∀λ ∈ Λ, which implies z ∈ A(X λ ) ∀λ ∈ Λ, by Lemma A.2.
